On the adequacy of current empirical evaluations of formal models of categorization by Wills, A. J. & Pothos, E. M.
Wills, A. J. & Pothos, E. M. (2012). On the adequacy of current empirical evaluations of formal 
models of categorization. Psychological bulletin, 138(1), 102 - 125. doi: 10.1037/a0025715 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0025715>
City Research Online
Original citation: Wills, A. J. & Pothos, E. M. (2012). On the adequacy of current empirical 
evaluations of formal models of categorization. Psychological bulletin, 138(1), 102 - 125. doi: 
10.1037/a0025715 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0025715>
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/1978/
 
Copyright & reuse
City  University  London has developed City  Research Online  so that  its  users  may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to 
check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact  
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.



















Revised manuscript for Psychological Bulletin  
17-Dec-12 
EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF CATEGORIZATION MODELS 1 
Abstract 
 
Categorization is one of the fundamental building blocks of cognition, and the study of 
categorization is notable for the extent to which formal modeling has been a central and 
influential component of research. However, the field has seen a proliferation of divergent, 
non-complementary models with little consensus on the relative adequacy of these accounts. 
Progress on assessing relative adequacy of formal categorization models against these criteria 
has, to date, been limited because (a) formal model comparisons are narrow in the number of 
models and phenomena considered, and (b) models do not often clearly define their 
explanatory scope. Progress is further hampered by the practice of fitting models with 
arbitrarily variable parameters to each data set independently. Reviewing examples of good 
practice in the literature, we conclude that model comparisons are most fruitful when relative 
adequacy is assessed by comparing well-defined models on the basis of the number and 
proportion of irreversible, ordinal, penetrable successes (principles of minimal flexibility, 
breadth, good-enough precision, maximal simplicity, and psychological focus).   
 
Keywords: categorization; cluster; exemplar; model selection; modeling; prototype. 
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The study of categorization is a fascinating endeavor. The process of constructing and 
using categories underpins our capacity to encode and apply information in the world in an 
efficient and competent manner but also, ultimately, our ability to think in terms of abstract 
ideas, such as justice, love, and happiness. Categories facilitate communication, and facilitate 
inferences about unobserved properties of objects. What are the mechanisms that correspond 
to psychological categorization processes? This question has been intensely studied for over 
fifty years (e.g. Bruner, Goodnow & Austin, 1956), and has led to some of the most 
sophisticated and influential mathematical, computational, and neuroscientific models in 
psychology. Indeed, categorization research contains one of the most influential formal 
models in all of psychology - the Generalized Context Model (Nosofsky, 1984)
1
. Yet there is 
also a profound divergence among modelers at the most fundamental level. How should 
categorization models be compared? What is the ideal form of a categorization model? What 
kind of categorization models should we aim to develop? The lack of consensus regarding 
such key issues has resulted in categorization research being carried out in increasingly 
independent strands and this has been inhibiting overall progress in the field. Nosofsky, 
Gluck, Palmeri, McKinley and Glauthier (1994) wrote, “Recent years have seen an avalanche 
of newly proposed models of category learning and representation. As such models grow 
increasingly more sophisticated, there is a need to develop increasingly more rigorous testing 
grounds so that one may choose among them” (p. 352). Almost 20 years later, progress 
towards this goal remains limited.   
In the current article, we first provide a definition of the term formal model, consider 
the principal advantages of formal modeling over other forms of theorizing, briefly 
summarize some of the leading formal models of categorization, and assess progress to date 
on the empirical evaluation and comparison of these models. We then set out the approaches 
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we believe are most likely to lead to progress in the future. We organize our conclusions in 
terms of a set of criteria for assessing the relative adequacy of models, and a list of  
dependent and independent variables that any adequate formal model of categorization 
should be expected to address. Although our focus is on the formal modeling of 
categorization, the issues we discuss and the proposals we make are not limited to the field of 
categorization research. As we outline below, formal modeling has a number of potential 
advantages, and these advantages are quite general. Similarly, the extent to which formal 
models deliver those advantages depends on the extent to which the problems and pitfalls 
considered in this article are avoided. Categorization research has been chosen for 
consideration in this paper because it is one of the parts of psychology in which formal 
modeling has featured particularly heavily (of course, not the only area – psycholinguistics 
research is another example). 
 
Definition of a formal model 
 A formal model is one that unambiguously specifies transformations from one or 
more independent variables (IVs) to one or more dependent variables (DVs). In the case of 
formal models of categorization, one independent variable is category structure and one 
dependent variable is categorization accuracy (for an illustration, see Figure 1). 
-- Figure 1 about here -- 
 The phrase “unambiguously specifies” is critical for the definition of a formal model. 
By unambiguous specification, we mean that the model must express the nature of the 
transformations such that, for a given set of inputs and model parameter values, the model’s 
output can be determined with some kind of algorithm. A reasonable proxy for algorithmic 
determinability is whether the process of determining the model’s output from its inputs and 
parameters could be performed by a computer program without further human intervention. 
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Note that unambiguous specification is not the same as determinism; a model’s output might, 
for example, be the probability of a particular response. The criterion of unambiguous 
specification largely excludes models expressed purely in verbal terms and typically involves 
mathematical expression (or expression in terms that can be unambiguously transformed into 
algorithmic operations, as in high-level computer programming languages).  
 
The case for formal modeling 
 As Murphy (2011) points out, formal modeling is not without its disadvantages. 
Compared to informal theories, developing formal models is more time consuming and, 
perhaps as a result, is arguably more likely to lead to the neglect of empirical phenomena that 
lie outside the model’s scope. So why model? There are at least six advantages to a formal 
modeling approach – recognition of problem complexity, deeper insight, ambiguity 
reduction, model comparison, behavior prediction and the prospect of automated cognition. 
We discuss each of these potential advantages of formal models over more informal theories 
below: 
Recognition of problem complexity 
 The experience of many modelers is that attempting to transform an informal theory 
into a formal model often leads to a recognition that the problem under study is substantially 
more complex than was immediately apparent. In categorization research (and in other areas 
of psychology) this is partly because informal theories make extensive use of verbal labels 
that denote intuitively obvious but computationally complex constructs. For example, in 
unsupervised classification (category formation in the absence of feedback), the category 
groupings selected most frequently by participants are often those that are most “intuitive” – 
but formally specifying what makes them so turns out to be quite complex (Pothos & Bailey, 
2009). 
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Deeper insight 
 In essence, a formal model is a data-reduction technique. Formal models can be 
thought of as compressing potentially very large data sets down to a small number of values – 
the parameters of the model. The extent to which these parameters allow a reconstruction of 
the data through the architecture of the model is the extent to which the compression is 
appropriate. As long as the model’s parameters are penetrable, this compression can lead to 
insights about empirical data that may not be obvious from the raw data set. We discuss this 
advantage further in the “penetrable models” section of the article. 
Ambiguity reduction  
 Definitionally, a formal model is one that unambiguously specifies IV-DV 
transformations. As a consequence, the ability of a formal model to encompass a particular 
set of empirical findings should be unambiguously determinable, given sufficient information 
about the state of the IVs that form part of the model’s input. Of course, to the extent that 
there is uncertainty about the empirical phenomenon itself (through, for example, 
measurement error) there may be uncertainty about a model’s ability to encompass that 
phenomenon. 
Behavior prediction and automated cognition 
 Formal models provide the prospect for prediction of behavior - if we can predict the 
output of cognitive processes from their input, we may also be able to reproduce aspects of 
cognition in artificial devices. Formal models are able to contribute to behavior prediction 
and automated cognition, over and above informal ones, because of the ambiguity reduction 
that they entail.  
Facilitation of theory comparison 
 If more than one formal theory exists and, for each of those theories, their ability to 
encompass known sets of empirical findings is unambiguously determinable, then it is 
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possible to compare the relative adequacy of those models. The potential for unambiguous 
determinability in formal models – and the inherent difficulty of unambiguous 
determinability in more informal forms of theorizing – constitutes one of the main advantages 
of formal modeling.  
 
Divergent, non-complementary models 
In this section, we briefly summarize some leading formal models of categorization. 
We do this in order to (a) illustrate the divergent, non-complementary nature of current 
models, and (b) to provide a context for our proposals concerning the empirical evaluation of 
models. The models considered in this section are: the Generalized Context Model, the 
Nosofsky-Smith-Minda prototype model, SUSTAIN, COVIS, KRES, the Simplicity model, 
and the Rational Model of Categorization. These models were chosen on the basis of either 
being highly influential, or encapsulating an important aspect of categorization theory, or 
making some unique or original contribution. Even within those criteria, there were a number 
of formal models of categorization that were worthy of inclusion, but which we nevertheless 
excluded in order to keep this section to a manageable length. Before describing specific 
models, we outline at a broad level the components such models typically have, and how 
those components relate to each other.  
Template for a Formal Model of Categorization 
At a general level, the purpose of categorization models is to organize information 
from our experience in such a way that it allows, amongst other things, predictions about how 
new stimuli should be classified. One can distinguish between the representations upon which 
categorization is based and the mechanisms that support the categorization process. However, 
such a distinction is not always clear-cut, as the nature of the representations affects the 
processes that are required to operate upon them and, reciprocally, the choice of processes 
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affects the forms of representation that are plausible. Throughout this paper, the term “formal 
model” denotes a specific combination of process and representational assumptions.  
-- Figure 2 about here -- 
 Figure 2 shows a broad schema for models of categorization; not all models have all 
components. Categorization is seldom modeled from a retinal starting point – most modelers 
assume some form of higher-level input representation of the presented stimulus. The 
attentionally-modulated information from the input representations activates one or more 
intermediate representations (e.g. prototypes, exemplars). Information from the intermediate 
representations activates one or more category representations via an evidential mechanism 
(e.g. similarity computations). Typically, more than one category representation will be 
activated to some degree. Equally, a mechanism has to be in place that can guide the 
formation of new categories. Either way, there is a need for a decision mechanism that turns 
graded information into a categorical response.  
Generalized Context Model 
 The Generalized Context Model (GCM; Nosofsky, 1984) is the most influential 
formal model of categorization to date
1
. The GCM is a model with exemplar-based 
intermediate representations (Figure 2) – in other words, it assumes that categories are 
represented through the storage of specific examples of members of those categories. Formal 
exemplar models of categorization can be traced back at least as far as Reed’s (1972) 
average-distance model, but GCM is most directly related to the Context Model (Medin & 
Schaffer, 1978).  
 As Figure 3A  illustrates, GCM represents stimulus input as points in a 
multidimensional space, with inter-item similarity considered to be a decreasing function of 
distance in that psychological space. The position of stimuli in that space is sometimes 
assumed, but more often derived from the multi-dimensional scaling of stimulus 
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identification confusion probabilities (Nosofsky, 1986), or pairwise similarity ratings 
(Palmeri & Nosofsky, 2001). Distance in psychological space is typically calculated with a 
Euclidean metric (Figure 3B) for integral stimuli, but with a city-block metric (Figure 3C) for 
separable stimuli. This follows part of Garner’s (1978) operationalization of the integral-
separable distinction (integral stimuli are also, for example, those whose dimensions are 
difficult to selectively attend; hue and saturation, for example).  
-- Figures 3 and 4 about here -- 
 Following Shepard (1958), the function relating distance in psychological space to 
similarity is typically exponential (Figure 3D). This similarity-distance function formalizes 
the process assumption that categorical decisions are strongly affected by stimuli that are 
close in psychological space, with differences in distance becoming less important as distance 
from the presented item increases. Where stimuli are highly confusable, a Gaussian rather 
than exponential function is sometimes used; this approximates trial-to-trial variability in 
stimulus representation (Ennis, 1988).  
 GCM also has an attentional mechanism. In GCM, selective attention is considered to 
operate on the dimensions of the psychological space (Figure 3A), with attention to 
dimension X being represented as a factor by which distances on that dimension are 
multiplied in order to calculate similarity. Conceptually, and as illustrated in Figure 4, this 
can be considered as the compression and stretching of psychological space. The inclusion of 
selective attention in GCM was originally motivated through its ability to provide an account 
for certain relationships between identification difficulty and categorization difficulty 
(Nosofsky, 1984, 1986).  GCM also has a parameter that allows for the overall expansion or 
contraction of psychological space (Figure 4C).  GCM’s formalization of selective attention 
encapsulates the ideas that (a) categorization accuracy can be enhanced by selective attention, 
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(b) selective attention to stimulus dimensions is a matter of degree, rather than all-or-none, 
(c) selective attention occurs at the level of stimulus dimensions.  
 The output of the GCM is a prediction about the probability with which each of the 
available category responses will be produced, as a function of the presented stimulus, and 
the nature of the exemplars presented to the participants. GCM’s evidential mechanism 
involves the computation of summed similarities. For example, if the available category 
responses are A and B, then GCM calculates the sum of the similarities of the presented 
stimulus to each of the stored exemplars belonging to category A (SA). The same calculation 
is performed for category B (SB). Simplifying slightly (see below), GCM’s decision 






   
          Equation 1 
 
, where γ was a subsequent addition to the model (Ashby & Maddox, 1993; Nosofsky & 
Zaki, 2002)  in order to allow it to account for the degree of response determinism seen in 
participants. As γ becomes large, the probability of selecting the category with the larger 
summed similarity approaches 1 and the probability of selecting the category with the smaller 
summed similarity approaches 0. Equation 1 is typically expressed in a more general form 
that permits more than two response options (Nosofsky, 1984). The calculation of summed 
similarities also takes into account memory strength (represented as a multiplicative factor of 
the stored item’s similarity score, Nosofsky, 1988) and the decision mechanism can include 
category response bias (represented as a multiplicative factor of the summed similarity, 
Nosofsky, 1984).  
 GCM has been the basis of a number of other models. The most influential of these is 
ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992). ALCOVE is an instantiation of GCM within a localist 
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connectionist framework, and it provides a formalization of the process by which the 
selective attention and memory-strength parameters of GCM change over time. In ALCOVE, 
both sets of parameters are determined by gradient descent – an idea closely similar to the 
reduction-of-prediction-error accounts of learning and learned attention provided by animal 
learning models (Mackintosh, 1975; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972).  Other extensions of GCM 
include the Extended Generalized Context Model (EGCM, Lamberts, 1995), which 
formalizes the assumption that stimulus representations are not perceived instantaneously, 
and the Exemplar-Based Random Walk model (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997a), which 
formalizes the assumption that categorical decision processes are not instantaneous.  
 In addition to the introduction of a highly influential formal model of categorization, 
work on GCM also demonstrated the potential of formal categorization models to provide 
very precise quantitative fits to observed phenomena. Indeed, the degree of precision that can 
sometimes be achieved by GCM is impressive (e.g. Nosofsky, 1986). The quantitative 
examination of a formal model can take a number of different forms and one approach 
concerns an emphasis on the minimization of an error term. As we will set out in a later 
section, evaluation of formal models solely on the degree to which they can minimize an error 
term can be problematic in a number of respects (as researchers working on GCM accept, see 
e.g. Nosofsky & Stanton, 2005, p. 613).  
 The GCM is the most widely known and understood of the current formal models of 
categorization. It also one of the most clearly specified. For these reasons alone, many of the 
examples employed in the current article are formulated in terms of the GCM. We do not 
intend to imply that the GCM is deficient compared to other models. In fact, we believe that 
the GCM’s clear specification is a great strength, and one that has facilitated the writing of 
this article.  
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Nosofsky-Smith-Minda (NSM) prototype model 
 Prototype models assume that each category has a single intermediate representation. 
That intermediate representation – the category prototype – is typically considered to be the 
average of the representations of the category examples, although some models assume that 
distributional information is also stored (Fried & Holyoak, 1984).  Formal prototype models 
of categorization can be traced back at least as far as Reed (1972), but arguably the most 
influential version of recent times has been the Nosofsky-Smith-Minda (NSM) prototype 
model, originally developed by Nosofsky (1987), and  extensively investigated in the work of 
Smith and Minda (e.g. Smith & Minda, 1998).  
 One of the interesting properties of the NSM prototype model is that, except in the 
critical aspect of stimulus representation, it is closely similar to the GCM. For example, it 
employs the same similarity-distance equations (Figure 3D), and the same decision functions 
(Equation 1), as the GCM. Such similarity between models on all but one, theoretically 
interesting, issue facilitates model comparison.  Work on the NSM model has included 
principled attempts to assess the relative adequacy of two qualitatively different formal 
models, for example the comparison of NSM with GCM (e.g. Smith, 2002). This is an 
approach to model comparison that we advocate throughout this article, as long as the 
comparison satisfies certain requirements (we will argue later that certain kinds of 
comparisons lead to more compelling conclusions than others). Comparison of qualitatively 
different models seems more likely to lead to progress in the field than evaluations of the fit 
of a single model or of the relative fit of a number of variants of an a priori favored class of 
model. We return to this point in more detail in a later section.  
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SUSTAIN 
 SUSTAIN (Love, Medin & Gureckis, 2004) is a formal model of categorization 
designed to account for both categorization probabilities and feature-inference probabilities. 
It also provides a formal model of the relationship between supervised and unsupervised 
category learning (i.e. category learning in the presence and absence of category labels), and 
makes different representational assumptions to either the GCM or the NSM prototype 
model. 
 SUSTAIN is able to provide an account of both categorization and feature inference 
as a result of being an auto-encoder – in other words, a model that seeks to reproduce and 
complete its input at its output. In such models (see also McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985) 
categorization and feature inference are differentiated by the nature of the information 
missing at input – in categorization, the category label is missing; in category-to-feature 
inference, the category label is present at input, but one or more of the features are absent. In 
both cases, the model takes this incomplete input, and attempts to reproduce it – with the 
missing information “filled in” – at its output. 
 In common with GCM and NSM, SUSTAIN represents stimulus input within a 
psychological space, and allows attentional modulation along the dimensions of that space. 
However, the attentional modulation in SUSTAIN affects the narrowness of the receptive 
field of cluster representations (see below), rather than GCM’s uniform compression/ 
expansion of an entire dimension. SUSTAIN also incorporates a bias to focus on a subset of 
stimulus dimensions.  
 In terms of intermediate representations, SUSTAIN is neither an exemplar model, nor 
a prototype model. Instead, its representations are clusters. Exemplars and prototypes are 
special cases of cluster-based representation and, as is the case with exemplars or prototypes, 
clusters are represented as points in psychological space. In exemplar-based representation 
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there is exactly one cluster for each experimenter-defined stimulus; in prototype-based 
representation there is exactly one cluster for each experimenter-defined category.  
 SUSTAIN forms and develops clusters in a trial-by-trial manner. The first stimulus 
presented is assigned its own cluster, centered on that stimulus. In supervised categorization, 
subsequent stimuli are assigned to their own cluster if the existing clusters make an incorrect 
prediction about the category membership of the presented item. In unsupervised 
categorization, a stimulus is assigned a new cluster if it is sufficiently different to the existing 
clusters – how different it has to be in order to produce a new cluster is a free parameter (i.e. 
a parameter whose value is assumed to be whatever makes the model most accurate in 
predicting performance).  
 In addition to the recruitment of new clusters, SUSTAIN engages in a number of 
other types of adaptation. First, clusters compete to represent the input, and the “winning” 
cluster (the one most similar to the presented item) adapts by moving in psychological space 
towards the location of the presented item. Second, the winning cluster modulates 
dimensional attention in the direction that increases its activity. Third, where feedback is 
available, connections from clusters to output units change in accordance with a delta rule 
(Widrow & Hoff, 1960). As in ALCOVE, the basic intuition underlying this adaptation is that 
the model learns in order to reduce prediction errors. SUSTAIN does not formalize how 
connections from clusters to output units change in the absence of feedback (Love et al., 
2004, p. 316). 
COVIS 
The COVIS model (Ashby et al., 1998) is unique in terms of the models considered 
here in that, from its inception, it has had both a computational and a neurological 
specification. The neurological specification of COVIS has motivated and guided some of the 
work on the neuroscience of categorization (for an overview see Ashby & Maddox, 2005). 
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The ultimate objective of the kind of approach exemplified by COVIS is that the 
computational and neuroscience components of a model should provide mutual constraints 
for each other. For example, the specification of intermediate representations should be 
constrained by the known neurophysiology of the systems that are hypothesized to support 
these representations. Equally, parameters in the computational part of the model can be 
related to neurological parameters - for example, COVIS links certain parameters in its 
learning equations to dopamine levels (Ashby, Paul, & Maddox, 2011).  
 COVIS has has three main components – an explicit system, a procedural-learning 
system, and a system that determines whether the explicit system or procedural-learning 
system controls responding. The intermediate representations of the explicit system in 
COVIS are unlike the other models so far discussed, in that the explicit system is seen as 
testing and selecting explicit rules about category membership. The set of rules considered by 
COVIS (the candidate rules) are one-dimensional (e.g. if length > X, then category A), and 
also sometimes includes rules constructed from one-dimensional rules in a Boolean manner 
(e.g. if length > X, and brightness > Y, then category A). For any one decision, only one rule 
controls the output of the explicit system – the active rule. If the decision is correct (as 
determined by feedback) then the active rule is unchanged. If the decision is incorrect, then a 
rule is selected from the set of candidate rules with a probability that reflects the rule’s 
current weight. Rule weight is derived from rule salience. For active rules, salience increases 
with correct responses and decreases with incorrect responses (both changes are subject to 
some noise, however). The salience of inactive rules remains unchanged. Rule weight for the 
active rule is defined as its salience plus a constant representing the individual’s tendency to 
perseverate. Rule weight for inactive rules equals their rule salience, with the exception of 
one randomly selected inactive rule, whose weight is increased by a mean of λ. The 
parameter λ represents the individual’s tendency to switch rules. The outputs of the explicit 
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system are (a) a category decision (e.g. “category A”), and (b) a confidence score for that 
decision. The explicit system is considered to be supported by the prefrontal cortex, the 
anterior cingulate, and the head of the caudate nucleus. 
 The procedural-learning system
2
 operates in a different way to the explicit system. As 
in the GCM and SUSTAIN, the input representation of the procedural-learning system is 
conceptualized as a psychological space. The intermediate representations in the procedural-
learning system are different to GCM, NSM, and SUSTAIN. Rather than exemplars, 
prototypes, or adaptive clusters, the procedural-learning system assumes that the 
psychological space is covered by a large number of pre-existing, fixed, radial basis units. A 
radial basis unit is one whose output is maximal when the presented stimulus coincides with 
it in psychological space, but whose output drops rapidly as distance between the stimulus 
and the center of the radial-basis unit increases. In the procedural-learning system of COVIS, 
the output of radial-basis units drops off as a Gaussian function. One way of viewing this 
form of intermediate representation is as an exemplar model where a very large number of 
evenly distributed exemplar representations are assumed to exist, even when no exemplars 
have been seen.   
 Of course, under such circumstances, these representations contain no information 
about category membership. The procedural-learning system resembles ALCOVE in that it 
assumes information about category membership is contained in connections from the radial-
basis units to response representations (an evidential mechanism). As in previous models we 
have discussed, these connections change in strength on the basis of feedback, with the 
principle of minimization of prediction error determining how these connections will change. 
The procedural learning system differs from these other models in that it assumes 
minimization of individual prediction errors (i.e. between a single radial-basis unit and a 
response unit; e.g. Mackintosh, 1975) rather than minimization of summed prediction error 
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(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). The outputs of the procedural system are (a) a category decision, 
and (b) a confidence score for that decision. Note that, unlike the other models described in 
this article, the procedural-learning system of COVIS has no attentional mechanism. Effects 
attributed to selective attention in other models are the product of the low-dimensional rules 
typically employed by the COVIS explicit system. The neurological structures associated 
with the procedural system are the inferotemporal cortex and the tail of the caudate nucleus. 
 The outputs of the explicit system and the procedural-learning system both feed into a 
competition resolution system. This resolution system decides whether it is the explicit 
system or the procedural-learning system that controls responding on a given occasion. In 
deciding the winner of this competition, the resolution system takes into account two factors 
– the trust the resolution system has in each component system, and confidence each of the 
component systems have in their output. The system for which the product of confidence and 
trust is higher wins the competition. In COVIS, trust is a global value – the current trust value 
for the explicit system is θE, which ranges between 0 and 1, and the current trust value for the 
procedural-learning system is θI, which is constrained to be 1 - θE. Trust in the explicit system 
increases if its response is correct, and decreases if its response is incorrect. In typical 
applications, trust in the explicit system starts very high (e.g. 0.99). 
 In considering categorization responses to be the product of a competition between a 
rule-like and an exemplar-like process, COVIS formalizes a particular dual-system approach 
to categorization that can be traced back at least as far as Brooks (1978). Another, non-
identical, formalization of a rules-and-exemplars theory is ATRIUM (Erickson & Kruschke, 
1998). However, unlike ATRIUM, and unlike the other models discussed in the current 
article, the COVIS formulation is expressed in terms of the assumed underlying 
neuroanatomy and neurochemistry.  
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KRES 
 All the preceding models focus on situations where the participants’ pre-experimental 
knowledge of the trained category structure is negligible. Whilst it is certainly easier to study 
categorization processes in the absence of any relevant pre-experimental knowledge, 
categorization outside the lab seldom operates in a knowledge vacuum. Indeed, the empirical 
study of prior knowledge effects on categorization has revealed a number of reliable 
phenomena (see Murphy, 2002, pp. 141-198 for a review). The Knowledge RESonance 
model (KRES, Rehder & Murphy, 2003) provides a formal account of some of these 
phenomena.  
 Input representations in KRES are different to those in any of the models so far 
considered. Stimulus dimensions are represented by a set of mutually exclusive and mutually 
inhibitory features. KRES also assumes that output representations inhibit each other - this 
use of mutually inhibitory output representations is analogous to the “pick the best” category 
decision rule of COVIS and is approximated by the choice rule used by GCM and NSM 
(although the approximation becomes poor with more than two categories; Wills, Reimers, 
Stewart, Suret and McLaren, 2000).  
 As in ALCOVE, and in the procedural-learning system of COVIS, category 
knowledge in KRES is represented by the formation of connections whose strength changes 
in accordance with the principle of reduction of prediction error. However, unlike ALCOVE 
or COVIS, KRES also permits connections between input units (see also McClelland & 
Rumelhart, 1985). In KRES, prior knowledge is represented in two ways – (a) pre-existing 
feature-feature connections, (b) pre-existing feature-category connections. 
 Another aspect that distinguishes KRES from models such as ALCOVE or COVIS is 
that KRES is a recurrent network. In all other models considered here, activation proceeds 
from input representations to output representations. In a recurrent network, activation also 
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proceeds from output representations to input representations, between different input 
representations and between different output representations. It is this resonance of 
information around the network that leads to some of the predictions of the KRES model 
concerning the effects of prior knowledge on categorization. 
Simplicity model 
 The Simplicity model (Pothos & Chater, 2002) is a model of unsupervised 
categorization. It is the first model specifically developed to explain category intuitiveness, 
that is, to explain why certain classifications for a set of concurrently presented stimuli 
appear more natural to naïve observers than others. It assumes that preferred classifications 
will involve groupings that maximize within-category similarity and minimize between-
category similarity, across all exemplars (see also Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Thus, like 
SUSTAIN, the simplicity model instantiates a preference for similarity-based groupings in 
unsupervised categorization. However SUSTAIN, unlike the simplicity model, has a bias 
towards groupings using a subset of the stimulus dimensions.  
 The simplicity model aims to predict the optimal number of categories in an 
unsupervised classification. It achieves this through a scheme for computing the codelengths 
for the similarity information between the items, with and without categories (the particular 
framework employed is Minimum Description Length, Rissanen, 1978). The codelength for 
similarity information with categories can be lower than the codelength without categories, if 
the categories can provide an efficient way of coding for this similarity information. Whether 
this is possible or not clearly depends on how categories can code for similarity information 
and the particular assumption in the simplicity model is that a category is a set of objects for 
which all within-category similarities are greater than any between-category similarity 
(following Rosch & Mervis, 1975). If the similarity structure of a set of objects is consistent 
with this definition (for a set of categories), then categories can simplify the description of the 
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corresponding similarity information.  Note that the assumption of how categories code for 
similarity information is analogous to the specification of prior distributions in Bayesian 
approaches (cf. Chater, 1996). 
 The simplicity model assumes that the optimal number of categories appropriate for a 
set of objects is the number that reduces the codelength for describing similarity information 
for that set of objects the most. Also, the difference between the codelength with categories 
and the codelength without categories is a measure of the intuitiveness of the category 
structure. The latter is the unique contribution of the simplicity model, as no other model can 
immediately produce a value that can be interpreted as psychological intuitiveness (and 
indeed this has been a dependent variable neglected in categorization research). Having a 
quantitative measure of category intuitiveness can be very useful. For example, it allows the 
model to make parameter-free predictions about dimensional attention (Pothos & Close, 
2008; cf. Colreavy and Lewandowsky, 2008).  
 The simplicity model’s use of information theory comes at a price: the model has to 
assume a non-metric space, so that similarity information is represented in terms of relative 
magnitudes of similarities. This implies that, as long as categories are well separated, the 
degree of separation does not matter and also the spread of categories does not matter. These 
are important assumptions regarding the implementation of the simplicity model which have 
yet to be confirmed.  
Rational model 
 The Rational Model of Categorization (RMC; Anderson, 1991) is a trial-by-trial 
model of categorization, based on Bayesian updating of probabilities. Specifically, it 
determines the classification of a novel instance in terms of how likely the instance’s features 
are, given the observed features of the members of different categories. As a result, the RMC 
effectively favors clusters of items that are similar to each other. Like SUSTAIN, but unlike 
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the simplicity model, RMC has a free parameter that determines how dissimilar a new 
stimulus has to be to in order for it to form a new cluster. However, in SUSTAIN, this free 
parameter only applies to unsupervised categorization, whilst in the RMC, it applies to both 
supervised and unsupervised categorization. Also, like SUSTAIN, the RMC is able to 
provide an account of both categorization and feature inference. One way in which attentional 
selection can be implemented in the RMC is in terms of prior biases for particular dimensions 
(Anderson, 1991; for an alternative approach see Pothos & Bailey, 2009). 
 One aspect that the RMC shares with the GCM is that the RMC has formed the basis 
of a number of developments and related models. For example, Anderson and Matessa (1992) 
proposed a modification to account for people’s sensitivity to feature correlations, and 
Sanborn, Griffiths and Navarro (2006) have proposed a variant that allows order-independent 
classification predictions.  
 Summary 
 The formal modeling of categorization is currently characterized by considerable 
diversity - these models differ on most aspects it would be possible for categorization models 
to differ. For example, the nature of intermediate representations (prototypes, exemplars, 
adaptive clusters, fixed radial basis units), the nature of selective attention, single vs. multiple 
systems approaches, feed forward vs. recurrent information flow, pick-the-best versus ratio 
rule (Equation 1) decisions, similarity-based versus Bayesian classification. Those aspects of 
the models for which there is consensus, or at least some convergence, tend to be constructs 
from outside categorization research, and about which the formal modeling of cognition as a 
whole has largely converged (e.g. adaptation as being driven by the minimization of 
prediction error – see Friston, 2010, for the wide applicability of this concept). 
 This high degree of divergence amongst formal models of categorization obviously 
poses a profound challenge to any experimental psychologist attempting to provide principled 
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empirical tests between different models. Moreover, it is hard to see these multiple models as 
complementary. In order for them to be complementary, there would have to be consensus on 
the situations in which each is best applied. This does not exist. 
 Reflecting on the arguments we made in favor of formal modeling, one might 
reasonably argue that formal modeling of categorization has led to an increased appreciation 
of the complexity of the problem, and also some deeper insight into empirical phenomena. 
However, the presence of multiple, domain-general, models subverts many of the other 
advantages of formal modeling – having multiple domain-general models does not serve the 
goals of ambiguity reduction or behavior prediction (except, of course, in the special case 
where all models behave in the same way). The way to rectify this problem is to make use of 
the other main advantage of formal models – their ability to facilitate theory comparison 
against empirical data. In the next section, we evaluate current practice in model comparison 
within the field of categorization research, and make a series of best-practice 
recommendations designed to maximize the chances for further progress. The issue of model 
comparison is clearly pertinent for many areas of psychology, including areas with a close 
relation to categorization such as recognition memory (Nosofsky & Stanton, 2006) and 
magnitude estimation (Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007); however, the specific examples upon 
which we draw in this article are from studies of categorization. 
 
Model comparison 
 Model comparison, as defined here, is the comparison of at least two different classes 
of model that have some currency in the literature, where the comparison concerns the 
relative adequacy of those models to account for certain empirical phenomena. One example 
of this kind of model comparison is the work by Nosofsky and Stanton (2005). In that paper, 
the authors compared exemplar, prototype and decision-bound models on their ability to 
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account for the effects of probabilistic versus deterministic feedback on the accuracy and 
speed of categorization. An exemplar model provided the best account of these data.  
 In contrast, research that evaluates the ability of a single model to encompass certain 
phenomena does not constitute model comparison as defined here. For example, Nosofsky 
and Palmeri (1996) present a demonstration that the ALCOVE model can accommodate the 
results of a variant of the Shepard et al. (1961) experiment (see Figure 1) in which the 
stimulus dimensions are integral (rather than separable, as in the original demonstration). 
Such modeling work has considerable merit – it shows, for example, that there is at least one 
extant model that can account for what has been found. Nevertheless, work of this type seems 
unlikely to resolve the problem of multiple, divergent, non-complementary formal models of 
categorization, which is the focus of the current article. 
 Similarly, comparing variants of the same class of model is undoubtedly important in 
the development and refinement of a particular theoretical approach, but does little to solve 
the central problem of multiple, divergent, non-complementary models. For example, 
Nosofsky and Kruschke (1992) report (amongst other things) a comparison of the GCM 
model with a subsequent development of the GCM. Work of this type is useful in the sense 
that it helps motivate the development of models within a particular class, but does not 
directly address the problem of resolving relations between divergent, non-complementary, 
classes of model. A similar point pertains to comparisons where one model is well-
established, but the comparison model has no currency in the literature, and the less-well 
established model is found to be inferior. Such comparisons have their uses, but they seem 
unlikely to resolve the problem we consider here. 
 There are numerous positive examples of model comparison in the categorization 
literature. For example, exemplar models have been compared against configural-cue models 
(Nosofsky, Kruschke & McKinley, 1992; Nosofsky et al., 1994), prototype models (Smith & 
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Minda, 2000), the Rational model (Nosofsky et al., 1994; Pothos & Bailey, 2009), and 
decision-bound models (McKinley & Nosofsky, 1996; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997b; Little, 
Nosofsky & Denton, 2011). And yet, limited progress appears to have been made in reducing 
the number of divergent, non-complementary models of categorization. Decision-bound 
models have been around in something approaching their current form for more than 20 years 
(Ashby & Gott, 1988), yet are still the subject of evaluation in current research (e.g. Little et 
al., 2011). Configural-cue models have also been a feature of categorization research for 
more than 20 years (e.g. Gluck & Bower, 1988) yet some of their key processing and 
representational assumptions live on in models such as KRES. Prototype models of 
categorization have been with us for at least 40 years (e.g. Reed, 1972), but still motivate 
current research (e.g. Homa, Hout, Milliken & Milliken, 2011). Why the apparent lack of 
confident progress towards reducing the number of divergent, non-complementary models of 
categorization? 
 One possibility is that, as these are all very complex models and as principled 
comparisons pose profound empirical, computational, and theoretical challenges, overall 
progress is inevitably slow. No doubt, this is part of the answer. Another possibility, and the 
one we explore in this article, is that progress is slower than it needs to because formal model 
comparisons in categorization have generally been rather narrow. For example, Smith and 
Minda (2000) presented an analysis comparing the GCM, the NSM prototype model, and 
variants thereof, against many replications of a study that examined response probabilities for 
a set of test items subsequent to training on one particular category structure (the “5-4” 
structure, introduced by Medin & Schaffer, 1978)
3
. Hence, the comparison was restricted not 
just to the same kind of evidence (classification probabilities) but effectively to variants of 
the same data set. Pothos and Bailey (2009) explored the ability of three different models (an 
unsupervised version of the GCM, the simplicity model, and the RMC) to account for five 
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different data sets. While initially promising, as it turned out, none of the models were clearly 
superior across all five data sets, showing that a low ratio of data sets to models (5:3) was not 
adequate to discriminate between these models (equally, that the particular data sets were 
non-diagnostic in this comparison).  
 There are numerous other examples where model comparison has been restricted to 
one or two experiments (e.g. Little et al., 2011; McKinley & Nosofsky, 1996; Nosofsky, 
Kruschke & McKinley, 1992; Nosofsky et al., 1994; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997b; Nosofsky 
& Stanton, 2005; Stanton, Nosofsky & Zaki, 2002). One might argue that narrow 
comparisons are the result of what can reasonably be achieved in a single research article. No 
doubt there is some truth in this argument, and researchers in the categorization field do 
appreciate the necessity for broader comparisons. However, narrow comparisons are not 
unavoidable in a general sense. For example, in the modeling of reading aloud, Perry, Ziegler 
and Zorzi (2007) compared three models against thirteen benchmark phenomena. In the final 
section of the current paper, we return to the issue of the extent to which broad comparisons 
are feasible. 
 We start from the, in principle, non-controversial point that a key goal for formal 
modeling must be to assess the relative adequacy of the numerous pre-existing models 
against a broader range of the known empirical phenomena - to not do so is to essentially 
negate most of the reasons for favoring formal models in the first place. In the current article, 
we consider the ways in which a formal model can be assessed against empirical phenomena 
and consider some of the reasons that have led to narrow model comparisons. Then, we 
identify the approaches in the literature that we consider to be the gold standard for model 
evaluation and development. We also list the range of DVs and IVs against which formal 
models of categorization could reasonably be expected to be assessed. Even though all these 
variables have been considered in the categorization literature (some more than others), we 
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think it is important to summarize them here, as in practice model comparison has been 
restricted to a handful of variables. 
  
Assessing relative adequacy 
Returning to our earlier definition, a formal model transforms changes in one or more 
IVs into changes in one or more DVs. If model X does this better than model Y, model X 
should be preferred over model Y – but how should relative adequacy be operationalized? 
Below, we make the case that relative adequacy should be assessed by comparing well-
defined models on the basis of the number and proportion of irreversible, ordinal, penetrable 
successes in accounting for empirical phenomena. Each of the components of this 
operationalization of relative adequacy is discussed in the sections that follow. 
Ordinal adequacy 
 One way to assess the empirical adequacy of formal categorization models is to 
evaluate their ability to minimize the quantitative difference between their outputs and some 
empirical observations. We describe this as SSE adequacy (SSE is an acronym for sum of 
squared errors, a common measure of quantitative difference).  Assessing formal models 
solely on the basis of SSE adequacy has two serious problems: 
 (1) SSE does not distinguish between quantitative and qualitative adequacy, as 
illustrated in Figure 5. On an SSE measure, the two models in Figure 5 are indistinguishable 
– they have the same SSE. Yet, most theorists would agree that the model in Figure 5B 
provides a better account of the empirical results than the model in Figure 5A. This is 
because the model in Figure 5B correctly predicts that increases in the IV lead to increases in 
the DV, whilst Figure 5A makes the opposite prediction.  
-- Figure 5 about here -- 
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 (2) A reliably lower SSE is not necessarily indicative of a more adequate model. 
Indeed, except in the purely theoretical case where measurement error is zero, the model with 
the lower SSE can sometimes be the less adequate model, if its lower SSE comes from its 
greater ability to fit noise. This phenomenon is described as overfitting. 
Overfitting can be revealed by techniques such as cross-validation – one splits the 
data into a calibration and a validation sample (typically, the calibration and validation 
samples are two random subsets of the responses made by a participant). The model 
parameters are estimated via minimization of SSE on the calibration sample, and then the 
same parameters are applied to the validation sample. The greater the increase in SSE from 
the calibration sample to the validation sample, the more likely it is that the model overfitted 
the calibration sample.  
Overfitting is a real possibility in the formal modeling of categorization. For example, 
Minda and Smith (2001) argued that a prototype model provided a better account of a 
particular set of data than an exemplar model on the basis of a small difference in quantitative 
fit (the prototype model was closer to the data by about three percentage points on average). 
In a replication that included cross-validation analysis, Olsson Wennerholm and Lyxzen 
(2004) demonstrated that the prototype model showed a greater increase in SSE from 
calibration to validation sample than did the exemplar model, with both models showing the 
same level of fit in the validation sample. This raises the possibility that the superior 
quantitative fit of the prototype model in the calibration sample (and, by extension, in Minda 
and Smith, 2001) was due to overfitting. Nosofsky and Zaki (2002) also queried the Minda 
and Smith’s (2001) results, noting that where the GCM exemplar model included a response-
scaling parameter (γ in Equation 1), it could accommodate Minda and Smith’s results better 
than a prototype model. However, Olsson et al. (2004) demonstrated that the version of GCM 
including the response-scaling parameter also showed a greater increase in SSE from 
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calibration to validation sample, than did a version of GCM not including a response-scaling 
parameter (with both versions of GCM producing equivalent levels of fit in the validation 
sample). This again illustrates the potential for overfitting in the comparison of formal 
models of categorization. Of course, the issue of whether the inclusion of a gamma parameter 
leads to overfitting in the narrow comparison of three models to one experiment is different 
to the issue of whether the GCM (or any other model) requires a gamma parameter in order to 
be able to accommodate a broader range of results. 
 In summary, SSE is dissociated from important aspects of relative adequacy – two 
models can have the same SSE in cases where most theorists would agree one is superior, and 
better SSE can sometimes indicate a less adequate model. For both these reasons, we argue 
that the primary evaluation of formal models of categorization should be against a criterion of 
ordinal adequacy. In other words, we are suggesting that models should primarily be 
assessed first as to whether they capture the ordinal properties of a data set. For example, in 
the Shepard et al. (1961) data set (see Figure 1), this might mean getting the six problem 
types in the correct order of difficulty. Assessing adequacy by the ability to reproduce the 
ordinal properties of a data set eliminates the problem described in Figure 5 – the model in 
Figure 5B is the more adequate account under a criterion of ordinal adequacy. Adopting 
ordinal adequacy as the primary measure of success also reduces (but does not necessarily 
eliminate) the risks of illusory model superiority due to overfitting.  
 An ordinal adequacy criterion does not limit models to simple findings – one could 
assess, for example, whether a model could reproduce the ordering of the curvatures of a 
category acquisition function, or the kurtosis of a set of RT distributions. And making ordinal 
adequacy primary does not render SSE redundant. Where, across a broad range of 
phenomena, models are indistinguishable on an ordinal basis, cross-validated differences in 
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SSE provide a useful secondary measure of model adequacy (as do Bayesian methods of 
model selection, e.g. Boucher & Dienes, 2003; Pitt, Kim & Myung, 2003).  
 There are cases in the literature that include assessments of ordinal adequacy, 
including many of those we referred to in the earlier discussion of our definition of model 
comparison. For example, in Nosofsky et al. (1994), GCM is shown to make an ordinally 
different prediction to certain configural-cue models (Gluck & Bower, 1988), with the data 
being consistent with the GCM’s predictions. Similarly, in Nosofsky and Palmeri (1997b), 
the EBRW model is shown to make an ordinally different prediction to a decision-bound 
model, with the data being consistent with the EBRW model. 
 There are also cases where model comparison has proceeded solely on the closeness 
of quantitative fit, with both models being able to accommodate the ordinal pattern observed.  
For example, McKinley and Nosofsky (1995) concluded in favor of a variant of the GCM 
model (over a decision-bound model) solely on the basis of degree of quantitative fit. 
Similarly, Shin and Nosofsky (1992) report a comparison in which GCM accounted for 98% 
of the variance whilst the prototype model accounted for 94% of the variance.  
 In summary, some model comparisons in categorization research have included 
ordinal success as part of their evaluation, whilst others have relied solely on the quantitative 
closeness of fit. Our argument is that comparisons that include a consideration of ordinal 
success represent best practice, for the reasons outlined above. Of course, regardless of 
whether evaluations are based solely on SSE, or whether they additionally include 
consideration of ordinal success, it remains important that models provide an account of as 
much as the collected data as possible, rather than focusing on one or two collected data 
points at the expense of ignoring the rest of the data. 
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Functions of quantitative adequacy 
 To clarify, we are not advocating a complete avoidance of a quantitative approach to 
model evaluation. We believe quantitative adequacy, when considered in combination with 
ordinal success, can serve important functions. For example, whilst the focus of the current 
article is on formal model comparison, this is not the only way in which formal models can 
be employed. Another use of formal models is as an existence proof that a particular model 
has the potential to encompass a particular result. One example of this approach is Nosofsky 
and Zaki’s (1998) demonstration that a version of GCM can account for the fact that 
amnesics are sometimes more impaired on old-new recognition than they are on 
categorization (Knowlton & Squire, 1993), a result previously considered to be outside the 
scope of single-system theories. The impact of such existence proofs seems to be increased if 
the formal model captures not only the ordinal patterns of the experiment, but also provides a 
striking degree of quantitative closeness. The issue of what degree of closeness is required to 
be sufficiently impressive is, of course, rather vague in situations where only one formal 
model is considered. Nevertheless, it is beyond dispute that quantitatively close existence 
proofs can have a profound impact on the field (as measured by, for example, the number of 
citations they receive). 
 Another potential use for quantitative adequacy is in situations where all models 
under comparison capture the ordinal patterns in the data. Under such circumstances, one 
may wish to favor the model that produces the closest overall quantitative fit. In situations 
where one is confident that the difference in quantitative fit does not result from overfitting 
(see above), closeness of quantitative fit may provide some useful additional information, 
both in terms of relative model success and in terms of estimation of parameter values (as 
parameter values can provide information about how models account for an empirical 
finding). More generally, ordinal success is, by definition, a coarser measure than closeness 
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of quantitative fit – the latter takes into account the magnitude of effects whilst the former 
does not. It is conceivable that, as the comparison of models against a broad set of data 
proceeds, a trade-off will emerge where Model X accounts for more ordinal patterns than 
Model Y, but at the expense of having lower quantitative adequacy than Model Y. The issue 
of which model is the more adequate under these conditions would rightly be a topic for 
serious debate, and a measure of quantitative adequacy would clearly be necessary to inform 
that debate. 
Irreversible success 
 We argued earlier that one of the main advantages of formal models over more 
informal forms of theorizing was the potential of formal models for ambiguity reduction. We 
also argued that one reason this potential had failed to be realized in the formal modeling of 
categorization was the presence of multiple domain-general models and no consensus on the 
relative adequacy of these models. Here, we emphasize that achieving progress towards 
consensus requires an avoidance of arbitrarily variable parameters, and an evaluation of the 
relative adequacy of models through an examination of the irreversible successes that can be 
attributed to them. Below, we provide a definition of the concept of arbitrarily variable 
parameters, illustrate why they are a problem, and propose the assessment of relative 
adequacy through irreversible modeling successes. 
 Arbitrarily variable parameters 
 A model parameter is some (usually numerical) information that is part of the model 
specification, rather than provided via the IV inputs. Most models have parameters, including 
some of the most successful and elegant formal models ever created (e.g. Newtonian gravity). 
Having parameters, even a large number of parameters, does not in itself cause any problems 
of ambiguity – it is what the modeler does with those parameters that is at issue. 
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 In the formal modeling of cognition, the term free parameter is in common usage. We 
define a free parameter as any parameter whose value is determined as part of the process of 
determining model adequacy. Determining optimal values for free parameters can be seen as 
part of the process of model development, and the presence of free parameters has no 
necessary consequences for model ambiguity – as long as the values of those parameters are 
universal. Universal free parameters are those whose specification is general to the whole 
domain of phenomena that the model is intended to address. By contrast, an arbitrarily 
variable parameter is one that can take different values for different levels of an independent 
variable, and where each of those values is determined through a process of maximizing 
model adequacy (as opposed to, for example, being determined by independently measurable 
properties of the stimulus, environment or participant).  
 The problem of arbitrarily variable parameters 
 Allowing parameters to take freely determined values for different levels of an IV can 
cause severe ambiguity if changes in the value of that parameter are able to cause ordinal 
changes in the model’s output.  For example, Wills, Suret and McLaren (2004) examined 
whether pre-exposure to two different stimulus types facilitated or retarded subsequent 
categorization of those stimuli. Let’s consider the IV here to be stimulus type (two levels – 
noise distorted vs. re-arrangement distorted) and the DV to be the direction of the exposure 
effect (two levels – retardation or facilitation). On that basis, four ordinally different things 
could have happened – of course, only one actually did (noise-distorted stimuli were 
facilitated; re-arrangement-distorted stimuli were retarded). One approach to modeling this 
experiment with the GCM would have been to allow c (the parameter controlling the overall 
expansion of psychological space, see Figure $C) to take four different values, one for pre-
exposed noise-distorted stimuli, one for non-preexposed rearrangement-distorted stimuli, and 
so on. By selecting four appropriate values for c, the results of Wills et al. (2004) could be 
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accommodated by the GCM. But so could the three other possible results of this experiment 
that were not found. Indeed, the use of arbitrarily variable parameters in this case leads the 




 An alternative approach to modeling the results of Wills et al. (2004) with the GCM 
would be to use as input to the GCM psychological spaces derived from similarity ratings 
taken both before and after pre-exposure. This might capture the representational changes 
that result from exposure, and might have allowed the GCM to fit the data with a single set of 
parameters for all four conditions. Such an approach does not provide an account of 
representational change, but it (a) provides a clear statement that the form of representational 
change observed in Wills et al. (2004) is outside the explanatory scope of the GCM, and (b) 
removes arbitrarily variable parameters from the model specification in this context. For both 
these reasons, this second application of GCM is more useful in assessing model adequacy 
than the first application
5
.  
 Defining irreversible success 
 The second application of GCM, if it worked, would also be an example of a model 
without arbitrarily variable parameters – but only in the microworld of the experiment 
discussed. Absence of arbitrarily variable parameters must properly be defined across the 
entirety of the data sets to which a model is applied – not just the context of a single study.  
 An ordinal success in reproducing the effects of IVs on DVs, in the absence of 
arbitrarily variable parameters, is what we describe as an irreversible success. The success is 
irreversible in the sense that turning one particular success into a failure (or, perhaps more 
appositely, a failure into a success) cannot be done without re-evaluating the model’s ability 
to fit the entire data set that defines the model’s domain. Derivation of a model’s parameters 
with respect to the full canon of data that represents its domain, rather than independent 
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derivation of these parameters for each experiment (or even each condition of each 
experiment), ensures the model’s successes are irreversible in the sense we have defined it 
here. 
Number of empirical successes  
 A model that accommodates more of what we know empirically is, other things being 
equal (see later sections), a better model. Hence, our proposal is that relative adequacy of 
formal models can be assessed on the basis of the number of irreversible ordinal successes 
that can be attributed to them. This proposal contrasts sharply with current practice in 
categorization research, which is to examine in depth the results of a single or a handful of 
experiments, rather than seek breadth. For example, the original publication of GCM 
(Nosofsky, 1984) assessed the model against the result of just one, at that point unreplicated, 
study with six participants (Shepard et al., 1961). Twenty years later, the original publication 
of SUSTAIN (Love et al., 2004) assessed the model against seven experiments. One 
commendable aspect of the original assessment of SUSTAIN was that it employed universal 
free parameters – in other words, parameters that had a common value across all seven 
studies. SUSTAIN therefore achieved 7 irreversible ordinal successes in its original 
publication. 
 Both GCM and SUSTAIN have subsequently been assessed against other data. 
However, in both cases, these assessments have largely been performed independently of the 
original assessments. In other words, subsequent publications have determined the value of 
the model’s parameters on the basis of maximizing the model’s ability to reproduce the 
results of the particular studies considered in that paper. Against the criteria we are 
proposing, these additional publications do not necessarily demonstrate an increase in the 
number of irreversible ordinal successes of the model, and therefore do not necessarily reflect 
incremental progress on this criterion. Note that, in employing GCM and SUSTAIN as 
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examples, we do not intend to imply that these problems are specific to those models, or even 
that they are specific to models of categorization (for a related argument in the formal 
modeling of perception, see Pitt et al., 2003, p. 30).   
 One way to have met the proposed criteria would have been to determine the values 
of free parameters by their ability to maximize the number of ordinal successes across the 
combined data set – in other words, all studies against which the model had previously been 
compared, plus the additional data being considered in the new paper.  Of course, it may be 
the case that different data sets will require different values for the model’s parameters. As 
previously stated, a model with a large number of parameters is not necessarily ambiguous – 
what matters is whether those parameters are arbitrarily variable.  For example, the 
attentional parameters in Nosofsky’s (1984) fit of the GCM to the data of Shepard et al. 
(1961) are not arbitrarily variable because they are constrained by the hypothesis that 
dimensional attention is allocated to maximize categorization accuracy (a hypothesis 
subsequently given a formal mechanism in the ALCOVE model). This hypothesis results in 
the attentional parameters of GCM taking different values for the different conditions of 
Shepard et al. (1961). However, this variation is not arbitrary – in fact, it means that there are 
essentially zero free parameters for attention in that application of GCM. 
 As an illustration of the shortcomings of evaluating results in isolation, consider the 
work of Medin and Schaffer (1978). In one of the most influential results in the early 
development of exemplar theories, Medin and Schaffer demonstrated that, within the 
category structure shown in Figure 6, participants learned to respond correctly to stimulus A2 
more quickly than they learned to respond correctly to stimulus A1. This occurred despite the 
fact that the features of A1 are in some sense more typical of Category A members than are 
the features of A2. Note that properties denoted “1” in Figure 6 are characteristic of Category 
A (occur more often in Category A than Category B). Hence A1 contains 3 properties 
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characteristic of A, whilst A2 contains 2 properties characteristic of A – A1 is more typical, 
but A2 is learned more quickly. Prototype models cannot accommodate this result, but 
exemplar theories can.    
 What is perhaps not always appreciated about the success of exemplar models in this 
context is that it is parameter dependent. For example, as Smith and Minda (2000, Figure 8) 
illustrate, both the observed ordinal pattern, and its opposite, can be accommodated by the 
GCM. One reaction to this state of affairs is to point out that GCM’s prediction of an A2 
advantage is robust across a broad range of parameters, and that the few parameter values that 
lead to the opposite prediction also lead to other, falsifiable, predictions (Nosofsky, personal 
communication). As a matter of logic, therefore, the question of what the GCM predicts 
about this seminal result cannot be resolved by considering this one result in isolation. It can 
only be resolved through the evaluation of GCM against a broad range of phenomena in a 
manner that avoids arbitrarily variable parameters. 
 One practical problem of our proposed “more is better” approach is the sheer size of 
the known phenomena. To give an idea of the scale of the problem, the number of 
experiments to which SUSTAIN was originally fit is lower than the number of publications 
on the subject of categorization in a single year of a major journal, and the number of 
publications since 1961 on the topic of categorization exceeds 2,000
6
. Of course, it’s good 
practice to only model phenomena that have been independently replicated. Also, many 
studies are superseded by later work, and some provide insufficient information to allow any 
of the candidate models to be assessed against them. Despite all this, the number of reliable 
phenomena is undoubtedly large compared to the number of phenomena against which 
categorization models have currently been compared.  And yet, it remains our contention that 
formal models of categorization should address them all. One key to making this a practical 
proposition, we believe, is to compare the relative adequacy of models that are well-defined 
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in terms of their explanatory scope. The importance of ensuring models are well-defined is 
discussed in the next section; below we consider an alternative to counting successes. 
Elimination by failure 
 One possible alternative to the approach of counting successes is the approach of the 
elimination of formal models by the detection of their parameter-independent failures. For 
example, Nosofsky and Stanton (2005) argued that a particular decision-bound model, 
irrespective of its parameter settings, is unable to predict any error or reaction time difference 
between the deterministic and probabilistic feedback conditions of their experiments. As a 
difference is found in those experiments, the decision-bound model clearly cannot 
accommodate the results found, and hence a parameter-independent failure of that model is 
demonstrated. Similarly, Nosofsky and Zaki (2002) demonstrated that the best fit of a 
prototype model to a particular data set produced ordinally incorrect predictions about the 
observed classification of exception items. The fact that a model’s best fit produces an 
ordinal failure implies that the failure is parameter independent. 
 The question of whether progress is best served by consideration of the numerosity of 
successes, or by specific falsifications, is as much a philosophical as an empirical question. 
Nevertheless, we tend to be persuaded by Kuhn’s (1962) historical analysis that specific 
falsifications do not, in practice, lead to the rejection of theories. We believe this is also the 
case in categorization research - one illustration is that, more than 30 years after the 
publication of Medin and Schaffer’s (1978) falsification, prototype-based accounts of 
categorization still seem to be the subject of research (e.g. Homa et al., 2011). Specific 
falsifications tend to lead, not to the rejection of theories, but to either a re-definition of the 
scope of the model that excludes the problematic result, or a refinement of the theory that 
turns failure into success. For example, whilst Medin and Schaffer’s (1978) result is robust 
within the design they employed (see e.g. Minda & Smith, 2002), prototype theorists have 
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accommodated this, and other apparent problems for prototype theory, in a variety of ways, 
including a proposal that there is a transition from prototype representations to exemplar 
representations during the course of training (Smith & Minda, 1998; but see also Johanssen & 
Palmeri, 2002).  
 In some cases, responding to falsifications by re-definitions and modifications may 
constitute incremental progress. In other cases, it may result in a set of mutually incompatible 
post-hoc changes. As with a success-based approach, the only way to evaluate the relative 
(in)adequacy of different models is to consider them against a broad range of data in such a 
way that one avoids the problem of arbitrary variation. Although the approach advocated in 
the current article focuses on successes rather than failures, many of the issues remain the 
same whichever of these two perspectives is adopted.  
Well-defined formal models 
 A well-defined model of categorization is one that considers all IV-DV combinations 
appearing in peer-reviewed publications on the topic of categorization. Well-defined models 
must either provide an account for an IV-DV combination or declare that the DV, IV, or both 
are outside its scope. For example, model X might provide an account of the effects of the 
duration of stimulus presentation on categorization accuracy. Model Y, in contrast, might not 
seek to provide such an account. Our argument is that Model Y should still contain a clear 
statement that this effect is beyond its explanatory scope.  
 It should be a straightforward matter to propose a model that is well-defined in terms 
of DVs – the modeler simply has to identify the DVs that are included in the model’s 
explanatory scope. Making a model well-specified in terms of IVs is harder, because our 
definition of “well-defined” requires the modeler to make a statement about IVs outside the 
model’s explanatory scope (e.g. the model does not account for changes in stimulus 
presentation time, and is applicable to self-paced situations). The large number of IVs makes 
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it likely that, in practice, being well-defined with respect to IVs will be a matter of degree. In 
a later section, we suggest a list of several major categories of IV against which it would be 
straightforward to define a model’s domain. This would represent a substantial improvement 
on current practice, where formal models of categorization tend to be ill-defined with respect 
to all IVs for which they do not explicitly define a transformation. 
A second advantage of ensuring models are well-defined is that it opens up the 
possibility of a secondary measure of relative adequacy – proportion of successes. Where two 
well-defined models have a comparable number of successes overall, we argue one should 
favor the model with the smaller explanatory scope (and hence the higher proportion of 
successes). For example, consider a model (“Model X”) that accounts for all of the results in 
its defined domain (“Domain A”). Such a model is adequate and useful in the sense that, 
within Domain A, it provides a good model of behavior. By contrast, if Model Y accounts for 
only 10% of results in Domain A (and so neglects to provide an account for 90%), it provides 
a less adequate model of Domain A, regardless of the fact that Model Y might be providing 
partial coverage of several other domains (so that overall the number of Model Y successes 
are comparable to the number of Model X successes). Providing an adequate model of a well-
defined but narrow domain seems to be of more use (in, for example, the sense of ambiguity 
reduction, behavior prediction and automated cognition) than providing a model that neglects 
to provide an account for the majority of the data across a broad domain.  
Penetrable models 
 By the term penetrable we intend to denote two different but related things – the 
effort required to apply a formal model, and the extent to which the verbal description that 
must inevitably accompany a formal model allows some understanding of the model’s 
processes in psychological terms. A more penetrable model is, other things being equal, a 
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better model. Below, we consider the effort and psychological explanation components of our 
definition of a penetrable model. 
 Effort 
 People often apply simple, incorrect models in preference to complex correct ones 
(e.g. Newtonian gravity instead of general relativity). Presumably, the reason they do this is 
that there is a real cost, in terms of time and effort, in understanding and applying the more 
complex model. Using the simpler, incorrect model is rational to the extent that the error 
introduced by the simpler model is minor compared to the additional effort required to apply 
the more complex, correct model. On this basis, we propose that where two models are 
approximately comparable in terms of the number and proportion of ordinal irreversible 
successes, the model that requires less effort to understand and apply is the relatively more 
adequate model.  
 Of course, the effort required to understand and apply a model is context dependent. 
For example, theorists with a background in connectionist modeling are likely to find a new 
connectionist model easier to understand and apply than a model whose basic formulation 
they are less familiar with (a model based on Bayesian rational analysis, perhaps). The 
comparison of models with different underlying bases might be encouraged by actions that 
reduce the effort required to understand and apply them. Two such actions are the provision 
of model summaries designed to be accessible to a more general audience (see, for example, 
Pothos & Wills, 2011), and the provision of publicly accessible computer-based 
implementations of models. Ideally, such implementations should be both transparent (for 
example, with relevant computer programs freely distributed as source code in a high-level 
computing language) and user-friendly (for example, by the provision of an associated user-
friendly interface).  
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 Psychological explanation 
 It is our contention that one property of a good formal model is that its formally-
expressed components are accompanied by a natural language approximation. In some cases, 
this approximation may be a modification to the meaning of, or a disambiguation of, an 
everyday term, or a pre-existing verbal psychological construct. There are at least five 
reasons why good models should have a natural language approximation.  First, a natural 
language approximation permits approximate understanding of the formal model with lower 
effort. For example, the GCM and the NSM prototype model make assumptions about 
category representation that have clear natural language approximations (exemplars, 
prototypes). Second, a natural language approximation will sometimes help clarify which 
aspects of a formal model are strong theoretical commitments, and which are not. For 
example, the natural language approximation for COVIS makes it clear the model has a 
strong theoretical commitment to the idea that categorization results from the competition 
between multiple processes. This, in turn, enables empirical tests which are better focused to 
the core assumptions in a model.  
 A third reason why good models should have a natural language approximation is 
that, by so doing, the model makes more connections to the bulk of psychological theorizing 
– which, of course, remains informal. For example, in GCM, w - the multiplicative factor by 
which distance on a psychological dimension is modulated - has the natural language 
approximation “attention weight”. The presence of this natural language approximation 
allows one to make predictions about the relationship between w and certain DVs that would 
have been impossible otherwise  - for example, relationships between w and eye gaze 
duration (Rehder & Hoffman, 2005).  
A fourth way in which a natural language approximation helps to make connections 
with the bulk of psychological theorizing is by clarifying the central organizing principle of 
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the model. For example, the simplicity model is based on the central organizing principle that 
cognition can be understood as a process of re-encoding information in order to reduce 
redundancy. 
A fifth situation in which natural language approximations are important is where 
formal models are used as a form of data-reduction technique. For example, Johansen and 
Palmeri (2002) employed the ALCOVE model, and a single-dimension variant thereof, as a 
data-reduction analysis in support of the claim that categorization strategies change from 
unidimensional to multidimensional with increasing experience of the stimuli.  The ability to 
provide a meaningful natural language approximation of the differences between models 
affects the theoretical impact of such techniques. 
A potential concern about natural language approximations is that, if applied in an 
overly-rigid manner, they might impede the development of truly novel explanations (as truly 
novel concepts, by definition, would not have a single pre-existing word that encapsulated 
them). One response to this concern is that natural language approximation should properly 
be an interactive process, with the link between a formal model and a natural language term 
leading, over time, to changes in the interpretation of that natural language term. For 
example, the etymology of the word mass can be traced back to the 11
th
 century but the 
meaning of this word underwent substantial development as a result of Newton’s work in the 
17
th
 century (“mass, n.2”, 2011). In psychology, the terms “rule” and “similarity” currently 
have a number of different definitions (Pothos, 2005) - it may be that the contextualization of 
such terms via reference to specific formal models may lead to a disambiguation of the sense 
a user intends. In more extreme cases, one might have to invent new verbal labels for a truly 
novel insight (e.g. “quark”, which was invented in the 1960s to represent developments in 
quantum mechanics; “quark, n.2”, 2011).  
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Summary 
 In this section, we have argued that the relative adequacy of formal models should be 
assessed in terms of the number and proportion of irreversible ordinal successes produced by 
well-defined penetrable models. Although most formal models of categorization are 
relatively penetrable on our above definition, progress to date against other aspects of our 
definition of relative adequacy has been limited. Model comparisons typically involve 
assessments of a small subset of current models against a narrow data set. Even leaving aside 
the issue of relative adequacy, the assessment of the number of irreversible successes 
attributable to any particular model has been limited because models are typically fitted to 
one experiment (or even one condition of one experiment) at a time, with the values of the 
model parameters being determined independently in each case. A collection of 
independently derived model fits does not constitute incremental progress against a criterion 
of number of irreversible successes, as it leaves uncertain the extent to which the model’s 
apparent success across the set is due to the presence of arbitrarily variable parameters. 
Number of irreversible ordinal successes is increased by demonstrating that the model can 
simultaneously produce those successes across the multiple data sets. 
 Another problem with the current state of formal modeling of categorization is that 
most models are largely ill-defined with respect to IVs. In the next section, we suggest 
several IVs against which all formal models of categorization could reasonably be expected 
to be well-defined. 
Priorities and explanatory scope 
 As noted earlier, the number of empirical categorization phenomena, and hence the 
number of DVs and IVs for which a formal model might hope to account, is large. Two ways 
to make manageable progress in the evaluation of formal models of categorization against 
empirical phenomena would be to (a) define  priorities with respect to which DVs are the 
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most important, and (b) agree a set of IVs against which a model’s domain could be defined. 
The following two sections make specific proposals regarding these two issues. 
Prioritizing DVs 
 The primary DVs for a formal model of categorization are those that directly index 
the classification decisions that are made. For example, accounting for patterns in the 
probability of a particular classification response must take priority over, for example, 
accounting for patterns in eye-gaze dwell time (e.g. Rehder & Hoffman, 2005). To illustrate, 
consider a situation where Model X accommodates the classification probabilities but not the 
eye-gaze measure, whilst Model Y accommodates the eye-gaze measure but makes ordinally 
incorrect predictions about the classification probabilities. We contend that, as a model of 
categorization, Model X is superior in this instance, as the primary purpose of a model of 
categorization behavior must be to account for classification decisions. It follows from this 
contention that, in a model of categorization, correctly accounting for classification 
probabilities has a higher priority than correctly accounting for eye-gaze durations.  
We describe DVs that directly index the outcome of categorization decisions as 
primary DVs, and other measurements as secondary DVs. On the basis of that definition, the 
measurement of event-related potentials (e.g. Wills, Lavric, Croft & Hodgson, 2007) is 
another example of a secondary DV, whilst measures of classification consistency (e.g. 
Haslam et al., 2007) or, relatedly, intuitiveness (Pothos & Bailey, 2009) are other examples 
of primary DVs on this definition. The question of whether reaction time measures (e.g. 
Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997a; Wills & McLaren, 1997) are primary or secondary is perhaps 
more controversial. Applying the criterion above, we argue that a model that can account for 
classification probabilities but not reaction times would, we believe, be generally considered 
to be more successful than a model that could account for reaction times but not classification 
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probabilities. On that basis, reaction time is a secondary DV, although we suspect that this 
assertion would not be universally accepted. 
 Secondary DVs nevertheless serve two important functions. First, they enable one to 
select between models with comparable numbers of successes on primary DVs. Second, they 
seem likely to serve a vital function in model development. Categorization models have 
internal states and it would be odd to ignore data that is potentially informative about such 
internal states. However, the relative adequacy of formal models of categorization should be 
assessed primarily against successes for primary DVs. 
Defining domains through IVs 
 Below are a range of IVs (more accurately, a range of sets of IVs, each set 
corresponding to a different source of empirical evidence) against which any formal model of 
categorization might reasonably be expected to define its domain. The list is not exhaustive - 
other important IV sets, not covered here for brevity, include cultural differences (Medin & 
Atran, 2004), personality variables (Ward, 1983; Wills, Longmore & Milton, 2011), and 
other individual differences (DeCaro, Thomas & Beilock, 2008; Milton, Longmore & Wills, 
2008; Tharp & Pickering, 2009). 
 Time pressure - There are a number of well-documented effects of time pressure on 
the acquisition of categories and on categorical decisions (e.g. Lamberts & Freeman, 1999; 
Milton et al., 2008; Smith & Kemler Nelson, 1984). The EGCM development of GCM 
provides an account of a subset of these phenomena; Ashby et al. (1998) make an informal 
argument that COVIS can account for a different subset. The remaining models neither 
provide an account nor define their domain with respect to this set of IVs. 
 Incidental categorization and concurrent load – There is a rich data set on situations 
where categorization occurs in the context of another task and how these situations can 
qualitatively affect categorizations decisions compared to situations of full attention (e.g. 
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Brooks, Squire-Graydon & Wood, 2007; Kemler Nelson, 1984; Milton et al., 2008; Smith & 
Kemler Nelson, 1984; Waldron & Ashby, 2001; Wills et al., 2011; Zeithamova & Maddox, 
2006). ALCOVE has been applied to a limited subset of these data (Nosofsky & Kruschke, 
2002), COVIS to a slightly larger subset (e.g. Ashby et al., 1998; Waldron & Ashby, 2001; 
Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006; but see also Newell, Dunn & Kalish, 2010). 
 Learning – DVs such as categorization accuracy and consistency demonstrably 
change with increasing experience of the stimulus set in both supervised and unsupervised 
categorization (e.g. Nosofsky, Gluck, Palmeri, McKinley & Gauthier, 1994; Wills & 
McLaren, 1998). Learning is occasionally accounted for by the GCM and NSM, but typically 
in an unconstrained way (e.g. Smith, Chapman & Roberts, 2010) or by assuming a linear 
relationship between frequency and memory strength (e.g. Nosofsky, 1988) – an essentially 
Hebbian assumption that empirical work indicates is incorrect (Griffiths & Mitchell, 2008). 
SUSTAIN and ALCOVE provide more constrained, prediction-error-based accounts of 
acquisition (e.g. Love et al., 2004; Nosofsky et al., 1994), and the Rational Model has also 
been fit to acquisition data (e.g., Nosofsky et al., 1994). The other models discussed in the 
current article are ill-defined with respect to this IV set. 
 Background knowledge – Background knowledge effects have been extensively 
examined in categorization (Murphy, 2002). KRES has been fitted to a subset of these data. It 
is unclear whether other formal models should be considered to include background 
knowledge effects as part of their domain.  
 Representational development – Many real-world stimuli are, compared to those 
typically used in categorization experiments, highly complex but also highly familiar. 
Perceptual difficulty, and level of familiarity with complex stimuli, can qualitatively affect 
the type of categories formed (Wills & McLaren, 1998) as well as classification accuracy 
(Attneave, 1957; McLaren, Leevers & Mackintosh, 1994; Wills et al., 2004).  As discussed 
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previously, one approach to representational development in the GCM is to accommodate it 
(e.g. via post-categorization multidimensional scaling, Palmeri & Nosofsky, 2001), rather 
than model it as such. This is a fairly clear, albeit implicit, example of a model defining its 
domain as excluding a set of IVs.  The domain of the other models discussed in the current 
article, with respect to IVs related to representational development, is less clear. 
 Number of categories – Most models of categorization are able to accommodate any 
number of category response options, and most implicitly provide an account of the effects of 
manipulating this IV as a by-product of adopting a variant of the Luce choice axiom 
(Equation 1). However, there is evidence that the Luce choice axiom does not correctly 
predict the relationship between 2-choice and 3-choice categorization probabilities (Wills et 
al., 2000). It is unclear whether models that employ the Luce choice axiom would therefore 
wish to define their domain as being restricted to situations where there are just two response 
options. 
 Unsupervised categorization – People are able to form category representations in the 
absence of feedback (Fried & Holyoak, 1984; Homa & Cultice, 1984). SUSTAIN, the 
Rational model, and the Simplicity model specifically allow for this possibility, and Pothos 
and Bailey (2009) have shown that the GCM can be modified to make predictions in this 
domain. Hence, many of the models discussed in the current article seem to include 
unsupervised categorization within their domain.  
 Abnormal brain function – In order to accommodate the effects of brain damage, 
formal models have to, at a minimum, clearly specify how that damage affects the parameters 
of the model. The GCM has been applied in this way to some relevant data on categorization 
and brain damage (Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998). The COVIS model makes specific predictions 
regarding how certain kinds of brain damage affect the categorization process (Ashby & Ell, 
2001; Pothos & Wood, 2009) and, subsequent to its original publication, the SUSTAIN 
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model has been given a neuropsychological interpretation (Love & Gureckis, 2007). It is less 
clear for the other formal models discussed in this article whether they are intended to 
exclude abnormal brain function from their domain.  
 Developmental differences – A rich data set demonstrates that children sometimes 
produce qualitatively different classification decisions to adults (e.g. Kemler, 1983; Minda, 
Desroches & Church, 2008). COVIS (see Ashby et al., 1998) and a variant of GCM (Smith, 
1989) has been applied to a subset of these data, SUSTAIN to a different subset (Gureckis & 
Love, 2004). For the other models reviewed in the current article, it remains unclear whether 
they should be considered to be specific to adult categorization behavior. 
 Species differences – Humans are not the only species able to categorize – impressive 
categorization abilities have also been reported in non-human primates (e.g. Delorme, 
Richard & Fabre-Thorpe, 2000), and in pigeons (e.g. Herrnstein & Loveland, 1964). From an 
evolutionary standpoint, it seems unlikely that the categorization processes of different 
species are entirely unrelated – and this is underlined both by reports of striking 
correspondences between human and non-human categorization performance in some cases 
(e.g. Smith, Chapman & Roberts, 2010; Smith, Beran, Crossley, Bloomer & Ashby, 2010; 
Wills et al., 2009) and by the extent to which formal models of human categorization have 
closely related antecedents amongst the formal models of animal learning. For example, 
Pearce’s configural model (1987, 1994) is similar to ALCOVE in some respects; EXIT 
(Kruschke, 2001) can be considered as a generalized version of Mackintosh’s (1975) theory 
of learned attention; SUSTAIN bears some resemblance to Saksida’s model of perceptual 
learning (Saksida, 1999).  GCM, COVIS, and NSM have all been applied to a subset of the 
data on categorization in non-humans (Smith, Chapman & Roberts, 2010; Smith et al., 2010). 
The remaining models are, presumably, intended to be human-specific. 
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Summary 
 The process of assessing formal models of categorization against the very large set of 
empirical categorization phenomena can be made more manageable by (a) prioritizing 
phenomena where the DVs are measures of decisions (as opposed to, for example, ERP 
components), and (b) ensuring models have well-defined domains with respect to IVs such as 
time pressure, full vs. divided attention, category acquisition, background knowledge, 
representational development, number of response options, supervised vs. unsupervised 
categorization, abnormal brain function, age, species, cultural background and personality 
variables. At present, formal models of categorization seldom define their domain for 
variables other than those for which they specifically seek to provide an account. 
 
Model Comparison and Neuroscience 
The models considered in this article differ dramatically in the extent to which 
neuroscience informed their formulation. At one end of the continuum, the Rational model 
and the Simplicity model formalize certain assumptions about the adaptive function of 
categorization, without reference to the neurological substrate that must necessarily 
instantiate these functions. Both the Rational Model and the Simplicity model, as currently 
implemented, involve computations which are intractable with moderately large numbers of 
items (but see Sanborn et al., 2010). For example, in the Rational Model, computation of 
classification probabilities involves a normalizing term across all possible classifications. 
Even for as few as 16 stimuli, this term would involve more than 10 billion computations.   
GCM and the NSM prototype model make specific process-level assumptions about 
categorization, but these assumptions exist independently from any neurological mechanism 
that might instantiate them. ALCOVE, SUSTAIN and KRES are somewhat informed by 
neuroscience, in the sense that they are connectionist and hence their microstructure has been 
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partly informed by what is known at an individual neuron level.  Indeed, neural plausibility at 
this level is one of the defining properties of connectionist modeling. However, whilst 
ALCOVE and KRES are somewhat neuron-like at their individual unit level, the architecture 
of ALCOVE and KRES seems to have been developed independently from information at the 
level of gross neuroanatomy. SUSTAIN is a slightly different case in the sense that although 
gross neuroanatomy was not discussed originally (Love et al., 2004), a consideration of the 
model in these terms did subsequently occur (Love and Gureckis, 2007) 
As previously discussed, COVIS is unique amongst the models considered in that its 
conceptualization from the outset was strongly informed by hypotheses about how different 
brain regions might compete and co-operate in the classification of objects. Interestingly, 
COVIS departs from connectionist modeling, in that parts of the computation of the explicit 
system are symbolic and the manner in which this symbolic system is implemented at the 
level of single neural-like units is not as yet specified (this is not to say that such an 
implementation is impossible, simply that no specific implementation forms part of the 
COVIS model at the current time). 
Throughout this article, we have emphasized the importance of comparing models 
over as broad a set of phenomena as possible. Specifying models in both computational and 
neuroscience terms will likely allow them to cover a broader range phenomena, in the simple 
sense that the neuroscience specification is an additional source of model constraints (and so 
of model predictions for behavior). Of course, it is not the case that non-neurological models 
are necessarily silent on neurological issues. For example, Nosofsky and Zaki (1998) 
accommodated differences in recognition and classification performance between amnesics 
and controls through changes in the overall confusability parameter of GCM (the c 
parameter). Nevertheless, it seems likely that due to the apparent functional specialization in 
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the brain, a model specified in neurological terms would be able to accommodate a broader 
range of independent variables than one that is not neurologically specified. 
In addition, specification of a model in neurological terms opens up the possibility of 
employing dependent variables that would otherwise seem to be largely unavailable. For 
example, it is hard to see how ALCOVE, GCM, KRES, or the Simplicity model, could – in 
their current form – accommodate dependent variables from brain imaging. Non-neurological 
formal models need not be silent on the interpretation of imaging studies, but their 
contribution seems likely to be informal. For example, regarding the single vs. multiple 
systems debate in categorization, Gureckis et al. (in press) presented imaging evidence 
supporting a single system hypothesis of previous imaging data, which had been taken to 
imply a multi-system account of categorization (Reber et al., 2003).  
A neuroscience specification of a formal model can also help leverage predictions in a 
broad range of fields. For example, the explicit system of COVIS critically involves the 
prefrontal cortex, which is generally considered to be a relatively late-maturing brain 
structure. This leads to the prediction that children should be particularly impaired relative to 
adults on categorization structures that COVIS indicates heavily involve the explicit system. 
There is some empirical support for this hypothesis (Minda, Desroches & Church, 2008). 
Another possible reason for specifying formal models in terms of their instantiation in 
gross neuroanatomy is that neurological plausibility might, in itself, be a reasonable (if 
informal) method of model comparison.  Many researchers from the mid 1980s onwards were 
convinced by the connectionist argument that, in the development of formal models of human 
behavior, it made sense to take into account what we know about the function of single 
neurons (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985). It seems to us that, if one finds this connectionist 
line of argument convincing, one should also accept the same argument when it comes to 
gross neuroanatomy.  
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Counter-arguments and responses 
 In this section, we consider a number of possible counter-arguments to the suggestion 
that relative adequacy should be assessed by comparing well-defined models on the basis of 
the number and proportion of irreversible, ordinal, penetrable successes. 
Feasibility 
One concern is that, even when one ensures models are well-defined, the comparison 
of models on the number of ordinal irreversible successes represents a utopian ideal rather 
than a practical research strategy. For example, one might argue that the volume of research 
involved in achieving this form of comparison is larger than the scope of any single research 
article. One might also point to the fact that, even in a case of the evaluation of two models 
against a single contrast, this work often requires multiple experiments (controls for 
confounds, tests of generality, and so forth) and hence these narrow comparisons may 
represent a practical limit as to what can be achieved in any single publication. 
 Considered as a whole, the body of work required by the approach we advocate is 
clearly larger than a single article can accommodate. However, current practice of formal 
modelers in categorization indicates there are ways around this practical problem. Individual 
phenomena can be, and are, considered at length in primary empirical articles. Formal 
modeling may play an important role in these empirical articles – for example, if formal 
models differ in their ability to accommodate that single phenomenon, then the phenomenon 
under study may be of broader theoretical interest. Through these necessarily narrow 
empirical articles, and their associated follow-up work, one begins to establish a database that 
should permit researchers to identify key phenomena. These key phenomena then provide a 
canon of results against which broad model comparisons can be conducted. 
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Key phenomena are those that, through the rigors of close examination, are generally 
considered to be empirically robust and of likely theoretical importance. There is unlikely to 
ever be complete agreement about what constitutes a key phenomenon, but we are hopeful 
that it is possible to settle on a relatively large number of phenomena for which there is a 
broad consensus about their theoretical importance. This consensus might take the form of a 
list of phenomena that any new model of categorization should be expected to be able to 
accommodate. For example, the results of Shepard et al. (1961, see Figure 1), and of Medin 
and Schaffer (1978, see Figure 6) are strong candidates for such a list. We also anticipate that 
a much longer list is possible, but construction of such a list is beyond the scope of the 
current article. 
Categorization modelers increasingly test their models against existing key 
phenomena, rather than attempt to derive new empirical data and test a model in the same 
study. For example, Love et al. (2004) evaluated the SUSTAIN model against 7 phenomena 
they considered to be key. Model parameters were held constant across the whole set of 
phenomena, so this paper represents 7 irreversible successes under the criteria proposed. 
Love et al. (2004) also formally considered the ALCOVE model against 4 of the 7 
phenomena against which SUSTAIN had also been assessed (the remaining three phenomena 
were presumably considered to be outside ALCOVE’s explanatory scope). Note that, in Love 
et al.’s evaluation of ALCOVE, model parameters were estimated independently for each of 
the four phenomena, so these do not constitute irreversible success as defined here. As 
ALCOVE was unable to capture one of these four phenomena (the results of Medin, Dewey 
& Murphy, 1983), whilst SUSTAIN was able to capture all four, the additional flexibility 
afforded ALCOVE in this case may have over-estimated its relative adequacy in the context 
of these four phenomena anyway. Of course, from the perspective of the current article, the 
central issue is that the comparison of two models against four phenomena is still a fairly 
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narrow comparison, relative to the number of “live” models and reliable phenomena within 
the domain of those models.  
Another example that captures aspects of the approach we advocate is the work 
reported in Nosofsky (1992). In this publication, four models are formally compared against 
the results of more than thirty previously reported experiments. What is missing, from our 
perspective, is that (a) the comparison is limited to SSE adequacy, and (b) model parameters 
are determined independently for each comparison, and hence the consideration of multiple 
studies does not increase the number of successes, at least under the criteria proposed here. 
Given the existing work, a research article that combined the strengths of the approach taken 
by Love et al. (2004) and by Nosofsky (1992), which is the approach we advocate, seems like 
the next logical step. It may be that practical limits on the length of a single research paper 
mean that, as the number of reliable phenomena and candidate models increases, single 
papers will, of necessity, focus on either the establishment of new empirical phenomena, or 
on the relative adequacy of formal models across a broad range of well-established 
phenomena.  
Another potential concern about the feasibility of the approach we advocate is the 
issue of whether it is practical to expect model parameters to remain constant across different 
experiments when those experiments involve, for example, different stimuli, and populations 
of participants. We have a number of responses to this concern.  
First, our proposal represents a suggested goal for the formal modeling of 
categorization. The goal is a challenging one, and progress towards it is likely to be 
incremental rather than immediate. One might therefore anticipate the continued presence of 
arbitrarily variable parameters, at least to a limited extent, for some time to come.   
Second, holding parameters constant across multiple experiments is clearly not 
impossible, as it has already been achieved in the work of Love et al. (2004). Perhaps one of 
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the reasons Love et al. (2004) were able to achieve this was their focus on the ordinal 
predictions of the model, rather than on precise quantitative fit. It may be that, at least for the 
current models, ordinal success is most that can reasonably be achieved in broad 
comparisons. 
Third, our approach does not necessarily require that parameters are constant across 
experiments, simply that their values can be determined in a non-arbitrary way. For example, 
some stimulus dimensions are separable whilst others are relatively integral. The integrality 
of stimulus dimensions can be determined empirically in a number of ways (Garner, 1978), 
and this data can be used to determine in a non-arbitrary way whether a Euclidean or city-
block metric is employed in a particular comparison of GCM to classification data.  
The issue of differing populations of participants permits a couple of different 
responses. First, to the extent that different populations result in ordinally different patterns of 
results in the same experiments, this is presumably an important phenomenon in its own 
right. Accordingly. it should be possible, through further research, to identify the nature of 
the differences in such a way that they can be accommodated by models in a non-arbitrary 
manner (indeed, such investigations are essentially part of cross-cultural research; cf. Lopez 
et al., 1997) Alternatively, it would be possible to define the scope of models to include only 
particular populations.  Second, if the focus of modeling is to account for the results of each 
individual, rather than just the group average (and strong arguments have been made for 
fitting models at an individual level, e.g. Ashby, Maddox & Lee, 1994; Smith, Murray & 
Minda, 1997; but see also Olsson et al., 2004), then it should be the case that an adequate 
model will have a fixed (or, at least, non-arbitrarily determined) set of parameter values for 
any given individual. This opens up the interesting possibility of the study of super-
participants – in other words, the process of asking participants to complete a substantial 
battery of key phenomena across multiple sessions, and fitting one’s model at the individual 
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participant level in terms of performance across that battery of results (assuming that these 
additional tests measure fairly stable characteristics).  
As Olsson et al. (1994) have previously pointed out, one of the dangers of fitting 
individual participant, rather than average, data is that individual data can be noisier and 
hence more prone to overfitting. A sensible precaution is to compare models on their ability 
to fit both individual data and group averages; Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis provides one 
principled method for doing this (Shiffrin, Lee, Kim & Wagenmakers, 2008). Also, where 
possible, it seems sensible to collect sufficient data from each participant such that methods 
such as cross-validation can be employed at an individual participant level.  
In summary, it would appear that there are several ways in which the dependence of 
models on arbitrarily variable parameters could be reduced and some researchers have 
adopted such approaches. Our point is that more effort should be invested in this direction, as 
it has the potential of greatly clarifying the issue of model comparisons.  
Sufficiency of the current proposals 
 We have argued that progress in formal modeling would be improved by the 
comparison of well-defined penetrable models on the basis of the number of irreversible 
ordinal successes that can be attributed to them across a broad range of key phenomena. 
However, this is unlikely to be sufficient. For example, it is also important to seek clarity 
about what plausible results a model could not fit. We think that the practice of comparing 
models on the basis of the number of irreversible ordinal successes should, through the 
elimination of arbitrarily variable parameters, reduce model flexibility and hence decrease the 
likelihood that models derive their success through being able to fit any plausible result. 
However, it is doubtless important to verify that the models that emerge from this broad 
comparison process are able to make falsifiable predictions, and that the ordinal pattern 
produced by a model is observed in the experimental data (see Roberts & Pashler, 2000, for 
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further discussion of these important points). One potentially powerful method for examining 
whether models can be falsified is parameter space partitioning (Pitt, Myung, Montenegro & 
Pooley, 2008). 
Differing goals 
 One defense of the continued existence of a large number of different formal models 
of categorization is that the different models reflect different research goals and hence the 
models are complementary rather than competing. For example, the modeling of reaction 
time distributions in the categorization of abstract items might be viewed as a different goal 
to the modeling of the effects of prior knowledge on classification probability. If the domains 
of these different models are well-defined, in the sense that the IVs and DVs to which they 
should and should not be applied is made explicit, then the models could indeed be 
considered to be complementary, and we have argued in this article (under the criterion of 
proportion of success) that the development of models with a relatively narrow explanatory 
scope might be one strategy in the process of developing adequate theories with a broad 
scope. Unfortunately, current formal models of categorization are typically ill-defined with 
respect to most DVs and IVs other than those to which they have been specifically applied. 
An explicit statement of the IVs and DVs to which a model is intended to apply would be a 
relatively straight forward way to assist progress in the formal modeling of categorization. 
 
Other issues 
Model selection statistics 
 In our discussion of the use of ordinal success in model comparison, we indicated that 
quantitative closeness may sometimes provide useful additional information.  For the sake of 
brevity of expression, we focused this discussion on one of the simplest measures of 
quantitative fit – the sum of squared errors (SSE). There are a number of alternatives to SSE 
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that instantiate an Occam’s razor approach to model selection. In other words, they aim to 
select the simplest model that provides an adequate explanation of the data.  For example, the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC: Akaike, 1973) includes a term that penalizes the model 
on the basis of the number of free parameters it contains. The Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC: Shwarz, 1978) serves a conceptually similar function. AIC and BIC are increasingly 
employed in the quantitative evaluation of formal models of categorization and other 
phenomena (e.g. Ashby et al., 1998; Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007). Although neither AIC nor 
BIC take account of the fact that models with the same number of parameters can differ in 
flexibility, more recent Bayesian methods avoid this limitation (Myung & Pitt, 1997).  
 Overall, statistics that take into account model flexibility are to be preferred over SSE 
as measures of quantitative fit, When used in the comparison of models across a broad range 
of phenomena, they have to potential to redress the vast flexibility that comes from allowing 
a model to take a different parameter values for each data set it is applied to. However, model 
selection statistics do not obviate the need to consider ordinal success, nor the importance of 
making comparisons across a broad range of phenomena. Indeed, model selection statistics 
may be actively misleading when applied to a narrow data set. It is not difficult to devise 
situations where a model is more complex than it needs to be to accommodate a narrow data 
set even where, in the context of a broader set of data, the more complex model is the more 
adequate one. 
Distinguishing representations from processes 
In Figure 2, we provided a broad schema for the components of a formal model of 
categorization. Some of these components were described as representations and others as 
processes. Although this kind of componential analysis can make models easier to describe, 
in reality a model’s behavior is often a product of subtle interactions between its components 
and it can be difficult to be sure which aspect of the model is responsible for its success (or 
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failure). For example, Rodrigues and Murre (2007) demonstrated that evidence taken to 
support the ATRIUM dual-system (rules and exemplars) model of categorization could also 
be accommodated by ALCOVE (a single-system exemplar model) if ALCOVE’s attentional 
system was modified to allow  exemplar-specific attention. Similarly, some results consistent 
with the cluster-based intermediate representations of the SUSTAIN model can also be 
accommodated by ALCOVE via exemplar-specific attention (Sakamoto, Matsuka & Love, 
2004). The presence of such interactions provides another reason for comparing models 
against as broad a set of phenomena as possible. Where comparisons are narrow, there are 
likely to be a number of qualitatively different models that can accommodate the data under 
consideration. As the breadth of data increases, the number of models that are functionally 
equivalent with respect to that data seems likely to reduce. In the limiting case, two 
differently formulated models that capture all known reliable data are functionally equivalent 
and can be compared on aspects other than number of irreversible successes – for example, 
their penetrability. 
Conclusion 
Categorization research is notable in psychology for the extent to which it 
incorporates formal modeling of empirical phenomena, but the last 25 years have seen a 
proliferation of models. Many of these models are considered by their proponents to be “live” 
(i.e. not obviously superseded). These models cannot be considered to be complementary, 
because this would require a clear specification of their complementary domains – such a 
specification does not exist. They must therefore be considered to be alternative, competing 
accounts of a common set of empirical phenomena. 
 In principle, the formal specification of models in psychology should allow one to 
assess the relative adequacy of competing accounts, against well-informed empirical tests. 
Yet, empirical comparisons of the adequacy of formal models of categorization typically 
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focus on comparing two or three models on a very narrow data set (often a single 
experiment). Even setting aside model comparison, assessment of the adequacy of individual 
models is typically assessed against a few experiments at a time, with model parameters 
being derived independently on each occasion. This makes it difficult to ascertain whether 
these separately determined successes are compatible with each other – in the sense of being 
accountable within the same set of model parameters. 
 A necessary, but not sufficient, condition for progress in the formal modeling in 
psychology is to reach consensus on the criteria by which relative model adequacy should be 
assessed. Through a review of examples of good practice in the current categorization 
literature, we have concluded that progress is most likely to be achieved by comparing well-
defined models on the basis of the number and proportion of irreversible, penetrable, ordinal 
successes that can be attributed to them across a broad range of key phenomena. Of the 
principles encapsulated in that statement, the irreversible nature of a model success is the 
most important – without that, formal modeling reduces to a more effortful version of 
informal verbal theorizing. Our definition of irreversible success is satisfied by counting 
successes with respect to evaluations employing global model parameters or principled 
accounts of how model parameters can be set in different situations. Probably the least 
important of the principles we propose is that of ordinal success. Other things being equal, 
better-than-ordinal precision is better than ordinal precision. But ordinal success seems an 
appropriate level to aim for at the current state of knowledge, and it avoids or reduces the risk 
and limitations inherent in relying on SSE for evaluating relative model adequacy. 
 Philosophically, the position we’ve taken in this article is most closely related to that 
of Lakatos (1978) rather than, for example, Popper (1934/1959) or Kuhn (1962). Lakatos 
(1978) argued that science differs from pseudoscience in that the former is able to make 
predictions about as-yet-unobserved phenomena. We argue that anyone wishing to claim that 
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the formal modeling of psychology could ever be a Lakatosian science should ensure they 
assess models in terms of irreversible successes. By so doing, models are more likely to be 
able to make clear predictions about novel phenomena and so restore confidence that the 
formal modeling of psychological phenomena is an endeavor worthy of the extensive effort 
and investment that it requires.  
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1. 2604 citations for 19 GCM papers published by Nosofsky. ISI Web-of-Science, 30-
Nov-2009. 
2. The design of the procedural-learning system in COVIS has changed over time; we 
concentrate here on the Striatal Pattern Classifier version (Ashby, Ennis & Spiering, 
2007).  
3. The extent to which the data sets considered by Smith and Minda were coherent and 
statistically independent is a matter of debate (Nosofsky, 2000). 
4. It is important to stress that this approach to modeling the result of Wills et al. (2004) 
is not something that has been advocated by proponents of GCM – it is provided 
merely as hypothetical but particularly clear illustration of the problem of arbitrarily 
variable parameters. 
5. Another possible solution would be to extend or modify the GCM to include a well-
defined process by which c changes with exposure; see McLaren & Mackintosh, 2000 
for one example of a formal model of exposure effects. 
6. 11 articles with topic categorization in the 2009 issues of JEP:LMC. 2686 articles 
with topic categorization; search limited to psychology and neuroscience (full search 

















Figure 1. (A) Six different ways to classify eight stimuli into two different 
groups; the stimuli take one of two values on each of three dimensions (color, 
size, shape). (B) Mean errors in learning these category structures from 
feedback, as a function of amount of feedback (learning block). Figure 1A 
reproduced from Shepard, Hovland & Jenkins (1961), Figure 1B reproduced 
from Love, Medin and Gureckis (2004). 
A. B. 








Figure 2. Schematic illustration of the typical representations and mechanisms of a formal 


























Figure 3. A. Representing the similarity structure of stimuli 1, 2 and 3 in a 2-
dimensional geometric space; in this example the dimensions of this space are readily 






). C. City-block 
distance (distance = x + y). D. An exponential decay relationship between similarity and 



















D. B. C. 









Figure 4. A. Geometric representation of two categories, each of four stimuli (category 
membership denoted by colour of dot). B. Stretching along the x-axis and compression along 
the y-axis, thereby increasing within-category similarity and decreasing between-category 
similarity. C. Overall expansion of psychological similarity space.  
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Figure 5. A. An ordinally incorrect model; sum of squared error (SSE) = 2. B. An 


































    C F S N      C F S N 
A1 1 1 1 0    B1 1 1 0 0 
A2 1 0 1 0    B2 0 1 1 0 
A3 1 0 1 1    B3 0 0 0 1 
A4 1 1 0 1    B4 0 0 0 0 
A5 0 1 1 1 
  
Figure 6.  The “5-4” category structure employed by Medin and Schaffer (1978). 
Category A has 5 items, category B has 4 items. C, F, S and N refer to the dimensions of 
color, form, size, and number. Each dimension takes one of two values, indicated by 1 or 0 in 
the above table. 
 
